Two recent developments have served to highlight the imperatives that drive Pakistan’s plutonium based nuclear advancement and its importance as an important factor in balancing the strategic military deterrence vis-à-vis India.

First; a report by the Institute of Science and International Security (ISIS) which claims that the progress of work at the third reactor at Khushab nuclear site, commenced in 2006, has picked up pace which is indicative of an effort by Pakistan to accelerate efforts for production of plutonium. The report underscores an earlier ISIS assessment which had concluded that expansion at the Khushab nuclear facility indicated that Pakistan had decided to speed up its weapon grade plutonium production program. Second; expression of frustration by US officials concerning Pakistan’s stance over the Fissile Material Cut off Treaty (FMCT)which has effectively blocked a resumption of negotiations on the controversial treaty. Since May 2009, driven primarily by its insecurity over being left out of the race to maintain a credible nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis India, Pakistan has been opposing the FMCT at the forum of 65 members Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva.
Given the backdrop of Indo Pak security equation, Pakistani efforts at advancing the plutonium leg of its nuclear program become understandable once the widening fissile material gap between India and Pakistan is brought into focus. Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and Plutonium are the two key ingredients for producing nuclear weapons. While the Indian nuclear program is primarily Plutonium based, Pakistan reliance is upon HEU related technology. As the indigenous base of nuclear expertise in Pakistan broadens, diversifying into the Plutonium based technology becomes the obvious next step. No capability can remain static and developing plutonium based weapons which are more compact and lighter as compared to those based on HEU technology, given the clear and present threat from India, remains an entirely legitimate, desirable and valid course of action.
Those sounding alarm over Khushab tend to ignore the hard fact that pursuit of Indian nuclear weapons’ program is supported by large holdings of weapon grade plutonium. Using the out put from two dedicated reactors, it is estimated that by 2009 India has accumulated 700 KG of plutonium that is sufficient for fabricating 40 nuclear weapons. The production from these reactors continues at a rate of about 30 KG per year. The disparity with Pakistan becomes staggering once the un-safeguarded power reactor plutonium (PRP) is brought into the reckoning. It is estimated that by 2009 India has accumulated seven metric tons of PRP which can be transformed into 700 warheads. India also retains the option of using stockpiles of PRP for fuelling fast breeder reactors (FBR); the first of which is likely to be commissioned in 2011. The FBR consumes PRP as fuel, turning it into weapons grade plutonium during the process. The FBR is likely to produce 90 – 140 KG of weapons grade plutonium per year that is sufficient for 20 -30 nuclear weapons. It is estimated that by 2020 India will have stockpiles of 1000 – 1500 KG of weapons’ grade plutonium.
Pakistan’s concerns regarding the Indian stockpiles are further compounded by the adverse implications of the Indo-US nuclear deal that was signed into a law in Oct 2008. Not only has it brought India into the mainstream of nuclear commerce without signing the NPT, it has enabled her to produce significant quantities of fissile material and nuclear weapons from un-safeguarded nuclear reactors. In a significant step, the Deal has freed the indigenously mined Uranium in India for exclusive production of weapons grade plutonium. It is estimated that India’s eight un-safeguarded heavy water nuclear plants will be able to use the domestic Uranium for producing 200 KG of weapons’ grade Plutonium which can be utilized for making about 40 weapons per year. It is pertinent noting that the Deal allows India to continue to keep outside safeguards its stockpiles of accumulated power reactor spent fuel and separated power reactor plutonium. India is also permitted leeway by the Deal to choose whether any future reactors it builds will be declared as military or civilian.
The Pakistani compulsion to maintain nuclear parity vis-à-vis India gains added significance once viewed in the framework of overall balance of deterrence; involving both nuclear and conventional segments. Large defence spending by India on enhancing its conventional war capability has placed Pakistan in the unenviable predicament of desperately playing the catch up game. India’s defence budget for 2009-2010 stands at a whopping $35 billion; registering a hike of 34 % – and allowing a $10 billion military expenditure during the current year alone. The Indian Force Goals have been freed from the constraints of enabling technologies that threaten to hamstring Pakistani endeavors for retaining a small yet technologically competitive force structure. The agreement signed between US and India; “Next Steps in Strategic Partnership”, in 2004, has pulled all the stops in facilitating India with the cutting edge technologies in vital fields of space program, missile defence, nuclear technology and high tech trade. Pushed to the wall, Pakistan’s security paradigm will have to rest increasingly on the pillar of nuclear deterrence.
The nuclear deterrence acquired by Pakistan is a proud national asset and a guarantor of national security in face of mounting Indian capability for aggression against Pakistan. Assistance provided to India by US through the Indo US Nuclear Deal and through access to sensitive and advanced defense oriented and space technologies are cause of worry for Pakistan. With the fissile material gap between India and Pakistan threatening to become unbridgeable, the development of Khushab Nuclear Plant is unavoidable and needs to be pursued with all the attendant devotion and alacrity.
This article has also been written by one Momin Iftikhar Momin. Kindly remove this confusion if both Momin Iftikhar and Khalid (not me) are the same writer with different nicks or both have picked up this article from somewhere else, and if so, why they did not make it a moral duty to mention the source. And what is the definition of plagiarism?
we love pakistan